

SEC. 1253. LIMITATION ON FUNDING FOR PEACE-KEEPING TRAINING EXERCISES WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348a) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(e) **LIMITATION ON FUNDING FOR PEACE-KEEPING TRAINING EXERCISES WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**—None of the funds authorized to be appropriated or otherwise made available to carry out this chapter, including for the Global Peace Operations Initiative of the Department of State, may be used to train or support foreign military forces that participate in peacekeeping training exercises hosted by the Government of the People's Republic of China or the People's Liberation Army unless, by not later than October 1 of each year, the Secretary of State certifies to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that such training or support is important to the national security interests of the United States.”.

SA 4643. Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

Beginning on page 566, strike line 10 and all that follows through page 570, line 6, and insert the following:

(2) NATO remains the strongest and most successful political-military alliance in the world, founded on a commitment by its members to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law;

(3) NATO's contributions to collective defense are indispensable to the security, prosperity, and freedom of its members;

(4) the United States reaffirms its ironclad commitment to NATO as the foundation of transatlantic security and to upholding its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, including Article 5;

(5) NATO is meant to be an alliance of countries with shared democratic values and the United States reaffirms its commitment to Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states the following: “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”;

(6) the commitment of NATO allies during 18 years of security, humanitarian, and stabilization operations in Afghanistan has been invaluable, and the sacrifices of NATO allies deserve the highest order of respect and gratitude;

(7) the United States remains focused on long-term strategic competition with Russia, and a strong NATO alliance plays an essential role in addressing such competition and mitigating shared security concerns;

(8) the United States should—

(A) deepen defense cooperation with non-NATO European partners, bilaterally and as part of the NATO alliance; and

(B) encourage security sector cooperation between NATO and non-NATO defense partners that complements and strengthens collective defense, interoperability, and allies' commitment to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

(9) bolstering NATO cooperation and enhancing security relationships with non-NATO European partners to counter Russian aggression, including Russia's use of hybrid warfare tactics and its willingness to use military power to alter the status quo, strengthens the United States security interests for long-term strategic competition;

(10) the European Deterrence Initiative, through investments to increase United States military presence, bolster exercises and training, enhance pre-positioning of equipment, improve infrastructure, and build partner capacity, and investments toward such efforts by NATO allies and other allies and partners, remain critical to ensuring collective defense in the future;

(11) the United States should—

(A) continue to support efforts by NATO allies to replace Soviet-era military systems and equipment with systems that are interoperable among NATO members; and

(B) work with NATO allies and other allies and partners to build permanent mechanisms to strengthen supply chains, enhance supply chain security, and fill supply chain gaps, including in critical sectors such as defense, energy, and health;

(12) the United States and NATO allies should—

(A) continue—

(i) to carry out key initiatives to enhance readiness, military mobility, and national resilience in support of NATO's ongoing COVID-19 pandemic response efforts;

(ii) to collaborate on ways to enhance collective security, with a focus on emerging and revolutionary technologies such as quantum computing, artificial intelligence, fifth generation telecommunications networks, and machine learning; and

(iii) to build on recent progress in achieving defense spending goals agreed to at the 2014 Wales Summit and reaffirmed at the 2016 Warsaw Summit and the 2021 Brussels Summit, and to build consensus to invest in the full range of defense capabilities necessary to deter and defend against potential adversaries; and

(B) expand cooperation efforts on cybersecurity issues to prevent adversaries and criminals from compromising critical systems and infrastructure; and

(13) [the United States should] encourage the development of a new NATO strategic concept that addresses the threats to NATO that have emerged since NATO's last strategic concept was published in 2010, including—

(A) a militarily resurgent Russia Federation, which is engaged in conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and the Middle East;

(B) the expansionist ambitions of the People's Republic of China, which increasingly threaten the economic and political integrity and physical security of NATO members; and

(C) transnational threats from rogue entities, such as extremist terrorist groups and criminal hacker groups.

SA 4644. Mr. RISCH (for himself and Mr. MENENDEZ) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Depart-

ment of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title XII, add the following:

Subtitle H—International Pandemic Preparedness and COVID-19 Response

SEC. 1291. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the “International Pandemic Preparedness and COVID-19 Response Act of 2021”.

SEC. 1292. DEFINITIONS.

In this subtitle:

(1) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;

(B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;

(C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and

(D) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) **GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY AGENDA; GHSA.**—The terms “Global Health Security Agenda” and “GHSA” mean the multi-sectoral initiative launched in 2014 and renewed in 2018 that brings together countries, regions, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector to elevate global health security as a national-level priority, to share best practices, and to facilitate national capacity to comply with and adhere to—

(A) the International Health Regulations (2005);

(B) the World Organisation for Animal Health international standards and guidelines;

(C) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004);

(D) the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Moscow, April 10, 1972 (commonly referred to as the “Biological Weapons Convention”);

(E) the Global Health Security Agenda 2024 Framework; and

(F) other relevant frameworks that contribute to global health security.

(3) **GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY INDEX.**—The term “Global Health Security Index” means the comprehensive assessment and benchmarking of health security and related capabilities across the countries that make up the States Parties to the International Health Regulations (2005).

(4) **GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY INITIATIVE.**—The term “Global Health Security Initiative” means the informal network of countries and organizations that came together in 2001 to undertake concerted global action to strengthen public health preparedness and response to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, including pandemic influenza.

(5) **JOINT EXTERNAL EVALUATION.**—The term “Joint External Evaluation” means the World Health Organization-facilitated, voluntary, collaborative, multi-sectoral process to assess country capacity to prevent, detect, and rapidly respond to public health risks occurring naturally or due to deliberate or accidental events, assess progress in achieving the targets under the International Health Regulations (2005), and recommend priority actions.

(6) **KEY STAKEHOLDERS.**—The term “key stakeholders” means actors engaged in efforts to advance global health security programs and objectives, including—

(A) national and local governments in partner countries;